





# FROM THE QUEUE TO THE REGISTER:



CITIZENS



DEMOCRACY



DEVELOPMENT

# Acknowledgements

The Christian Churches Monitoring Group extends its appreciation to all individuals and organisations whose contributions made the observation and documentation of the 2025 Voter Registration exercise possible.

CCMG is deeply grateful to all its 336 voter registration observers who were deployed across the country. Their commitment, professionalism, and resilience under challenging conditions were central to the collection of accurate, timely, and credible data that informed this report.

We further acknowledge the significant contributions of the CCMG Provincial Coordinators, together with the Communication and Finance teams. The Provincial Coordinators provided essential oversight at the provincial level, ensuring the effective organization of field deployment, the maintenance of supervision standards, and the timely submission of reports. The Communication team played a pivotal role in disseminating findings and facilitating engagement with the media, thereby enhancing public awareness and transparency. In parallel, the Finance team delivered indispensable administrative and logistical support, which enabled the efficient and seamless implementation of all observation activities.

Special thanks to the Program Director who provided the overall supervision and direction of the program, CCMG's partner organisations, the Council of Churches in Zambia, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia, and the Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops for their continued guidance, support, and commitment to promoting credible, peaceful, and inclusive electoral processes.

CCMG extends its appreciation to the Electoral Commission of Zambia for facilitating observer access to voter registration centres and for engaging with stakeholders throughout the voter registration exercise. CCMG also appreciates the cooperation of voter registration officials, security personnel, and other stakeholders encountered during the observation period.

CCMG also recognises the contributions of different stakeholders, civil society organisations, the media, traditional leaders, and citizens who played a role in voter education, mobilisation, and safeguarding democratic participation during the registration exercise.

Finally, CCMG is grateful to its development partners whose financial and technical assistance enabled the training, deployment, data analysis, and reporting necessary for this observation effort. Their support remains vital to strengthening transparency, accountability, and public confidence in Zambia's electoral processes.

## **Author:**

**Peter Mwanangombe**



# I. Introduction and Summary



**V**oter registration is a foundational pillar of electoral integrity and democratic participation. Beyond its technical function of compiling a list of eligible voters, the registration process directly shapes public confidence in elections and the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. In systems where registration is a prerequisite for participation, the quality, inclusiveness, and transparency of the voter register can either safeguard or undermine citizens' constitutional right to vote. As such, a credible voter registration process is central to democratic stability and trust in electoral institutions.

International standards underscore that voter registers must be accurate, inclusive, up to date, and transparent. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) emphasizes the need to balance broad inclusion of eligible citizens with effective safeguards against fraud and manipulation. Failures on either side of this balance carry serious risks: improper exclusion disenfranchises eligible voters, while improper inclusion erodes confidence in the integrity of elections.

Voter registration is also among the most administratively complex and politically sensitive electoral processes. Election Management Bodies (EMBs) must navigate logistical, technological, and institutional challenges, often within constrained timelines and resource environments. While biometric and digital registration systems can enhance accuracy, they also increase costs, technical demands, and vulnerability to operational failures. These challenges are magnified in contexts marked by high population mobility, uneven infrastructure, and gaps in civil registration systems.


In Zambia, voter registration has historically been conducted through periodic mass registration exercises preceding general elections. Although the Electoral Process Act mandates continuous voter registration, full implementation of this provision has been uneven. Against this backdrop, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) implemented the 2025 mobile mass voter registration exercise in six phases beginning in October 2025, with the objective of registering new voters and enabling eligible citizens to update their details ahead of the 2026 General Election.

The Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG) deployed trained, accredited observers to a statistically representative sample of registration centres across all six phases of the exercise. CCMG's observation sought to assess the extent to which the registration process complied with Zambia's legal framework, adhered to regional and international



standards, and promoted transparency, inclusiveness, and public confidence. This final report consolidates findings from all phases of observation, identifies systemic strengths and weaknesses, and offers constructive recommendations to strengthen future voter registration processes and Zambia's broader democratic architecture.

## II. Background and Context



Zambia's voter registration is guided by Article 229 (2) (c) of the Zambian Constitution which designates voter registration as one of the Commission's primary functions. Section 7 of the Electoral Process Act (EPA) mandates continuous voter registration, while Part II of the Electoral Process Act and the Electoral Process (Registration of Voters) Regulations, 2020, outline the mechanisms for its implementation. Before 2021, the ECZ had not operationalized Section 7 of the EPA and instead conducted mass voter registration in the year preceding a general election. Following the 2021 general elections, the ECZ began implementing Section 7 of the EPA by launching the Continuous Registration of Voters (CRV) in June 2022. It is important to note that CRV was only implemented in 30 of 116 Districts in the country.

Before the 2021 and previous general elections, ECZ conducted mobile mass voter registration with the aim of registering eligible voters ahead of a general election. This is consistent with standard practice within the region and in Africa. Countries such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Malawi, and Kenya, among others, implement mass mobile voter registration in the year preceding a general election. In view of this, the ECZ launched its mass mobile voter registration exercise across the country on 13 October 2025, implemented in six (6) phases.

The Electoral Commission of Zambia rolled out the 2025 mobile mass voter registration in October 2025 to allow new voters to register and existing voters to update their details, with the aim to have a complete and current register. CCMG deployed observers to a representative random sample of registration centres across all six phases to ensure that Zambia's voter registration process upholds constitutional guarantees, adheres to the Electoral Process Act and Electoral Process (Registration of Voters Regulations), aligns with international electoral standards, and promotes broad public confidence in the electoral process (see VII Methodology). CCMG has published three statements and two reports so far to present its provisional and preliminary findings. This report consolidates the findings from all phases, providing the final analysis based on the aggregation of observers' reports. The report serves not only to identify gaps but to support constructive engagement with electoral stakeholders and strengthen Zambia's democratic institutions ahead of the 2026 General Election.

### III. Observation and Findings



### ***Overview of Key Findings***

CCMG's observation of the 2025 mobile mass voter registration exercise reveals a mixed performance across the six phases, characterized by notable improvements in procedural integrity and technical reliability over time, alongside persistent structural and coordination challenges that constrained equitable access and transparency.

Operational performance improved in several respects as the exercise progressed. Observer access to registration centres increased, kit functionality stabilized, early centre closures declined, and adherence to registration procedures remained consistently high. The vast majority of centres required proof of eligibility, issued voter cards with photographs, safeguarded materials at the close of each day, and applied priority queueing for persons with disabilities, pregnant women, and nursing mothers. Instances of questionable registration practices, including underage registration or refusal to register eligible applicants, were rare and limited in scale.

At the same time, longstanding operational shortcomings persisted throughout the exercise. Registration centres frequently failed to open as scheduled, affecting approximately 12 percent of centres on average across all phases. These delays and closures were largely attributable to misalignment between national and district-level deployment plans, last-minute logistical challenges, and unannounced changes to registration locations. Staffing constraints were widespread, with over half of all registration centres operating with only one ECZ official, increasing workload pressures and vulnerability to service disruptions. Gender imbalances among registration officials also remained pronounced, with 41 percent of centres staffed exclusively by men.

Transparency and information-sharing gaps continued to undermine confidence in the process. At the onset of the exercise, the ECZ failed to adequately prepare for observer accreditation, resulting in 232 of 330 observers not receiving official accreditation by the start of the exercise. CCMG observers were denied access to daily registration statistics at an average of 14 percent of registration centres. These refusals, which persisted across all phases, are inconsistent with best practices for transparent electoral administration and limited stakeholders' ability to independently assess registration progress. Furthermore, CCMG reported one incident of harassment of one of its observers to the ECZ, the Zambia Police and the Human Rights Commission and to date, the perpetrator was sent a letter by the ECZ, warning him of consequences should he breach the Electoral Code of Conduct in future.



Logistical preparedness presented a further structural weakness. While nearly all centres were equipped with essential registration materials, only half had backup registration kits throughout the six phases. Although kit breakdowns declined substantially, from 19 percent of centres in Phase 1 to 5 percent in Phase 6, the absence of backup kits increased the risk of delays and temporary suspensions when technical failures occurred.



Accessibility barriers were widespread and systemic. Two-thirds of registration centres required registrants to navigate steps or stairs, presenting a significant obstacle for persons with disabilities, older persons, and others with limited mobility. These physical barriers persist despite commendable efforts to capture disability data and apply procedural accommodations.

Voter turnout increased steadily across phases, with an average of 48 registrants per centre per day nationwide and the highest average recorded in Phase 6. This trend reflects improved voter education and late-stage mobilisation efforts by the ECZ and media. However, participation by political party representatives and other observers declined over time, reducing multi-stakeholder oversight during the later stages of the exercise. Finally, while CCMG welcomed the extension of the voter registration period following Phase 6, the planning and communication surrounding the extension were inadequate. The absence of timely, disaggregated registration data and the failure to publish consolidated national deployment plans in a timely manner limited stakeholders' ability to assess under-registration, mobilise voters effectively, or effectively monitor the extension process. As such, CCMG was unable to deploy to a nationally representative sample of registration centres for the extension period from 12 November to 29 November. These shortcomings underscore the need for a more data-driven, coordinated, and transparent approach to voter registration planning.

*Table 1: Registration Centres with Critical Materials*

Material	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Registration Kit	100%	98%	100%	100%	99%	100%	99%
Backup Registration Kit	54%	49%	49%	48%	50%	50%	50%
Application Forms	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Working Camera	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	99%	99%
Laminates	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	99%

Table 2: Average Number of Registrants per Registration Centre

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	49	60	58	57	50	62	56
Copperbelt	31	53	40	48	38	73	47
Eastern	53	52	41	57	88	46	56
Luapula	28	48	48	54	56	46	47
Lusaka	30	27	42	38	42	104	47
Muchinga	60	51	40	43	37	37	45
North-Western	40	40	55	58	33	39	44
Northern	59	33	36	45	40	45	43
Southern	29	35	41	51	45	72	46
Western	32	45	55	57	61	49	50
<b>Total</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>48</b>

## IV. Detailed Findings from Voter Registration Observation



Drawing on observers reports, this section presents CCMG's detailed findings from CCMG's observation of the 2025 mobile mass voter registration exercise across all six phases. The section examines operational performance, transparency, accessibility, inclusiveness, stakeholder participation, and adherence to legal and procedural standards.


### ***Observation Access***

There was a significant improvement in terms of observers' access to registration centres across the phases of registration. While in the earlier phases 1% of observers were denied access, particularly in North-Western and Western Provinces, all observers were permitted access to registration centres in the later phases of the process.

Despite improvements in registration centres' opening, the issue of registration centres not opening as scheduled persisted. While in phase 1 16% of centres did not open, in the subsequent phases, between 9% and 12% of registration centres were not open. The issue was observed at 13% of centres on day 1 of the observation across all phases, and at 11% on day 2. These instances were most frequently reported in North-Western, Southern, and Eastern Provinces.

The primary causes appeared to be:

- District-level deployment schedules differing from ECZ's national deployment plan - this suggests weaknesses in coordination between ECZ headquarters and district-level implementation, rather than isolated logistical failures;
- Last-minute logistical challenges; and
- Unannounced venue changes that made centres difficult for voters, as well as observers, to locate.



*Table 1: Registration Centres with Critical Materials*

Material	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Registration Kit	100%	98%	100%	100%	99%	100%	99%
Backup Registration Kit	54%	49%	49%	48%	50%	50%	50%
Application Forms	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Working Camera	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	99%	99%
Laminates	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	99%



Table 3: Registration Centres Not Open

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	14%	14%	0%	13%	14%	17%	12%
Copperbelt	9%	6%	4%	10%	8%	4%	7%
Eastern	23%	19%	31%	7%	10%	21%	19%
Luapula	14%	7%	11%	7%	7%	4%	8%
Lusaka	0%	0%	7%	3%	5%	0%	2%
Muchinga	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	6%	2%
North-Western	43%	23%	18%	32%	18%	25%	26%
Northern	17%	0%	0%	6%	3%	10%	6%
Southern	21%	12%	24%	20%	10%	29%	19%
Western	22%	19%	12%	6%	20%	11%	15%
<b>Total</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>12%</b>

Delayed or failed opening of registration centres directly restricted voter access, particularly in rural and remote areas where alternative centres were not easily reachable. These types of disruptions have disproportionate effects on citizens with limited mobility.

Further, CCMG observers reported repeated instances of ECZ officers refusing to provide daily registration figures. On average, officials in 14% of registration centres refused to provide the figures to CCMG observers, reducing the transparency of the process. This occurred most frequently in Muchinga and in Northern provinces. Despite CCMG's recommendation to ensure transparency and share critical information with its observers, refusal of the daily figures persisted throughout the six registration phases.

Table 4: Registration Centres where CCMG Observers were not provided with Daily Registration Figures

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	9%	21%	10%	0%	8%	13%	10%
Copperbelt	12%	7%	11%	2%	14%	7%	9%
Eastern	8%	3%	0%	11%	18%	9%	9%
Luapula	25%	18%	4%	8%	20%	11%	14%
Lusaka	24%	7%	8%	13%	21%	15%	15%
Muchinga	13%	6%	15%	39%	33%	40%	24%
North-Western	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13%	2%
Northern	20%	22%	37%	30%	26%	37%	29%
Southern	16%	11%	13%	6%	32%	21%	17%
Western	31%	8%	25%	10%	17%	4%	15%
<b>Total</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>14%</b>

### Registration Centre Setup

Across all six registration phases, CCMG observers reported that at more than half of registration centres (53%), there was only one ECZ official present. This observation was consistent across the six phases, while in 2020, only 45% had only one ECZ official present. This was more of an issue in Central and Copperbelt Provinces (70% and 77%, respectively). Operating centres with a single registration official increases vulnerability to service interruptions, weakens internal checks, and heightens the impact of technical failures or staff absences. Additionally, at 41% of registration centres, there were no women officials. In 58% of registration centres, the official in charge was a man. Significant gender imbalances persisted, particularly in Central (50% of RCs with no woman and only 34% of RCs with a woman in charge of the centre), Copperbelt (46% of RCs with no woman and only 37% of RCs with a woman in charge of the centre), and Eastern (49% of RCs with no woman and only 34% of RCs with a woman in charge of the centre). Although some provinces showed modest improvements, the persistent underrepresentation of women, particularly in leadership roles, raises concerns about gender equity in electoral administration and limits progress toward inclusive institutional practices.

Table 5: Registration Centres with Only One Registration Official

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	52%	58%	63%	78%	83%	80%	70%
Copperbelt	71%	76%	68%	91%	77%	78%	77%
Eastern	71%	59%	76%	55%	50%	48%	59%
Luapula	33%	43%	40%	42%	32%	37%	38%
Lusaka	63%	45%	66%	71%	64%	46%	59%
Muchinga	44%	41%	30%	28%	33%	40%	36%
North-Western	70%	35%	39%	50%	67%	27%	47%
Northern	16%	31%	27%	40%	36%	30%	30%
Southern	56%	49%	59%	50%	42%	68%	53%
Western	38%	36%	29%	47%	33%	40%	37%
<b>Total</b>	<b>54%</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>59%</b>	<b>53%</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>53%</b>

### Accessibility

CCMG observers reported that registrants had to go up steps or stairs to reach the registration centre at 66% of registration centres. Physical access barriers remain widespread and will require a systematic plan to ensure that all Zambians, regardless of disability, are able to access electoral processes. While registration largely took place in daylight hours, 99% of registration centres had sufficient light during the registration process.




Table 6: Registration Centres with sufficient light during the voter registration process

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Copperbelt	100%	98%	95%	100%	98%	98%	98%
Eastern	96%	97%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Luapula	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Lusaka	100%	100%	95%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Muchinga	100%	100%	100%	100%	83%	93%	96%
North-Western	80%	94%	94%	94%	83%	93%	91%
Northern	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Southern	100%	100%	97%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Western	94%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%
<b>Total</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>99%</b>

### Critical Materials for Voter Registration

CCMG observers reported 99% of registration centres had all critical materials<sup>1</sup> for the exercise. However, only 50% of registration centres had backup registration kits with no significant improvement across the six phases of the mass voter registration exercise. The absence of the back-up kits was particularly significant in the Northern province where only 28% of centres were provided with one. This persistent shortfall increases the risk of disruptions when primary kits malfunction or power constraints arise, as was observed in the period covered by this report.

<sup>1</sup> Registration kits, application forms, working camera, laminates.





Table 7: Registration Centres with a Backup Registration Kit

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	57%	53%	53%	59%	50%	60%	55%
Copperbelt	41%	46%	41%	52%	43%	52%	46%
Eastern	61%	59%	59%	61%	63%	48%	58%
Luapula	54%	46%	20%	50%	80%	67%	53%
Lusaka	59%	50%	45%	34%	38%	50%	46%
Muchinga	56%	47%	45%	50%	44%	47%	48%
North-Western	40%	71%	72%	38%	56%	73%	60%
Northern	32%	19%	33%	30%	32%	26%	28%
Southern	66%	62%	56%	44%	39%	25%	49%
Western	69%	52%	75%	63%	67%	60%	64%
<b>Total</b>	<b>54%</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>50%</b>



#### ***Stakeholders Present During Voter Registration***

CCMG observed a high presence of security forces, who were systematically present at nearly all registration centres. However, CCMG noted a low presence of political party representatives. CCMG observers reported the following were present at the centres: security personnel at 99%; political parties including UPND at 4%, PF at 3% and other parties at only 3% of the registration centres. Other non-partisan observers were seen at 8% of registration centres. The decline in multi-stakeholder monitoring reduces oversight on the process. Additionally, while women represented 44% of security personnel deployed, the percentage of women deployed as party representatives remains considerably low.




Table 8a: Registration Centres with Key Stakeholders Present at Opening

Stakeholder	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Security Personnel	99%	100%	99%	100%	99%	99%	99%
PF Representative	5%	4%	3%	1%	3%	2%	3%
UPND Representative	6%	5%	4%	3%	2%	4%	4%
Representatives of Other Parties	4%	3%	3%	2%	3%	1%	3%
Other Non-Partisan Observers	11%	11%	8%	7%	3%	8%	8%


Table 8b: Percentage of Women Present at Registration Centres as Key Stakeholders

Stakeholder	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Security Personnel	43%	48%	42%	36%	49%	45%	44%
PF Representative	17%	8%	11%	0%	40%	40%	19%
UPND Representative	35%	21%	0%	28%	0%	18%	19%
Representatives of Other Parties	18%	22%	20%	60%	25%	33%	26%

## Registration Process

### Use of Registration Kit

CCMG's observers reported that at 99% of registration centres, ECZ officials appeared to know how to operate the voter registration kit. However, kit breakdowns at some point during the day affected 7% of centres across the six Phases. CCMG notes a decrease in the number of centres impacted by a kit breakdown from 19% of centres in phase 1 down to just 5% in phase 6. Additionally, CCMG observed a relative improvement between day 1 of registration phases with 8% experiencing a kit breakdown, down to 6% on day 2. CCMG commends the ECZ for taking appropriate action to address the issue observed at the early phases of the registration. However, delays caused by kit breakdowns can also be alleviated by having back up kits.



a

Table 9a: Use of Registration Kits at Registration Centres

Kit Function	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Know How to Use Kit	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Kit Breakdown at Some Point	19%	7%	5%	4%	5%	5%	7%

Table 9b: Kit Breakdown at Some Point




Table 9c: Registration Centres with Registration Kit Breakdown at Some Point

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	13%	5%	0%	0%	8%	4%	5%
Copperbelt	24%	11%	11%	5%	7%	4%	10%
Eastern	8%	3%	7%	5%	11%	12%	8%
Luapula	25%	4%	4%	4%	0%	4%	6%
Lusaka	27%	7%	13%	8%	5%	9%	12%
Muchinga	12%	12%	5%	0%	0%	0%	5%
North-Western	40%	6%	0%	0%	6%	0%	6%
Northern	4%	12%	3%	0%	0%	4%	4%
Southern	19%	3%	0%	13%	8%	0%	7%
Western	12%	8%	0%	0%	0%	4%	3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>7%</b>

### ***Following Registration Procedures***

CCMG's observers reported systematic adherence to registration procedures across all phases: 100% reporting that applicants showed proof of eligibility, 99% reporting that successful applicants were given a voters card with a photo, 99% reporting that registration materials were packed away safely at the end of the day at registration centres and only 1% reporting registration centres closed before 17h00 due to technical challenges including kit malfunctions. CCMG also reported high rates of adherence to key inclusion procedures, including that at only 2% of registration centres, officials did not record the disability type of any registrants with disabilities, and that at 93% of registration centres, PWDs, pregnant women and nursing mothers were allowed to go to the front of the queue.

## CCMG 2025 Mobile Voter Registration Observation Report – Phase 1 – 6 Report

Table 10a: Registration Centres following Registration Procedures

Procedure	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Applicants asked to show Proof of Eligibility	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Successful Applicants Given Voter ID Card with Photo	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Registration Materials Packed Away for Safekeeping at the End of the Day	98%	99%	99%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Registration Centre Closed Before 17hrs	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	2%	1%
Officials Recorded the Type of Disability of PWDs	98%	98%	97%	99%	99%	100%	98%
PWDs, Pregnant Women and Nursing Mothers allowed to the Front of the Queue	88%	94%	94%	94%	96%	94%	93%

Table 10b: Registration Centres where PWDS, Pregnant Women and Nursing Mothers are Allowed to Front of Queue

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	96%	95%	100%	96%	100%	100%	98%
Copperbelt	80%	87%	82%	98%	91%	96%	89%
Eastern	92%	97%	83%	87%	89%	88%	89%
Luapula	96%	93%	92%	85%	100%	89%	92%
Lusaka	85%	93%	97%	100%	97%	93%	94%
Muchinga	69%	94%	95%	78%	89%	87%	86%
North-Western	100%	88%	100%	94%	100%	93%	96%



Northern	84%	100%	97%	97%	96%	93%	95%
Southern	91%	95%	97%	100%	100%	100%	97%
Western	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>88%</b>	<b>94%</b>	<b>94%</b>	<b>94%</b>	<b>96%</b>	<b>94%</b>	<b>93%</b>



### **Potential Questionable Registrations**

CCMG's observers reported on potential questionable registration or disenfranchisement, in a limited number of centres affecting a small number of people: at only 1% of registration centres, there was registration of applicants who appeared to be underage (on average 2 voters per centre impacted), at 1% of registration centres, officials refused to register applicants who appeared to be eligible (on average 4 voters per centre impacted), with these instances reported mostly in Phase 1 to 3 with 2% of the RCs with a visible decrease across the next phases; at 1% of registration centres, there was registration of applicants without NRCs (on average 1 voter per centre impacted). CCMG observers reported only one instance of registration of applicants who appeared to be non-Zambians. In light of these findings, CCMG notes a broad respect for the verification of proof of eligibility and for adherence to registration procedures.

*Table 11: Registration Centres with Possible Questionable Registration*

Issue	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Registration of Applicants who Appeared Underage	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Registration of Applicants who Appeared to be non-Zambians	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Refusal to Register Applicants who Appeared Eligible	2%	2%	2%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Registration of Applicants without NRCs	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%

### **Potential Problems During Registration**

CCMG's observers reported instances of unauthorised individuals present in registration centres, security officers interfering in the process, and the registration process being suspended were reported at an average of 1% of registration centres. In 2% of registration centres, the process was suspended at a certain time of the day.

**Table 12: Registration Centres with Possible Registration Problems**

Issue	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Applicants Registering on Behalf of Others	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%
Unauthorized Individuals Present	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	1%
Uniformed Security Officials Interfering in Process	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Intimidation of Officials, Applicants, Party Representatives or Observers	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Attempts to Disrupt Process	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Process Suspended at Any Time	4%	3%	1%	1%	2%	3%	2%

### **Number of Registrants**

In instances where information was made available to CCMG's observers, observers reported on the total number of applicants registered per centre, with an average of 48 voters registered per centre per day nationwide during Phases 1 to 6. CCMG observers reported an increase in the average number of voters registered per day across the six phases with phase 6 recording the highest average (57 voters per centres) which reflects the late mobilization of voters to turn out and register. According to data reported by CCMG observers, 51% of registrants were female in areas where daily statistics were provided. Northern Province



recorded the highest number of female registrants at 59%. In contrast, Eastern and Muchinga Provinces recorded fewer than 50% female registrants. CCMG continues to recommend to the ECZ that the centre-based officers provide the provisional registration data at the end of each day to duly accredited observers and party agents, and to regularly update the public with disaggregated provisional registration figures.




Table 13a: Average Number of Registrants per Registration Centre

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	49	60	58	57	50	62	56
Copperbelt	31	53	40	48	38	73	47
Eastern	53	52	41	57	88	46	56
Luapula	28	48	48	54	56	46	47
Lusaka	30	27	42	38	42	104	47
Muchinga	60	51	40	43	37	37	45
North-Western	40	40	55	58	33	39	44
Northern	59	33	36	45	40	45	43
Southern	29	35	41	51	45	72	46
Western	32	45	55	57	61	49	50
<b>Total</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>48</b>

Table 13b: Percentage of Female Registrants

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	59%	55%	60%	56%	51%	55%	55%
Copperbelt	47%	46%	54%	51%	51%	46%	50%
Eastern	58%	55%	52%	50%	56%	59%	48%
Luapula	55%	51%	54%	56%	51%	56%	55%
Lusaka	48%	47%	43%	46%	50%	54%	50%
Muchinga	40%	44%	51%	56%	45%	38%	48%
North-Western	61%	49%	46%	54%	54%	48%	52%
Northern	57%	56%	54%	58%	56%	58%	59%
Southern	49%	56%	55%	48%	57%	51%	51%
Western	60%	61%	53%	51%	60%	50%	51%
<b>Total</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>53%</b>	<b>53%</b>	<b>52%</b>

**Extension of the Voter Registration Exercise:**

At the close of Phase 6 on 11 November, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) announced a fifteen-day extension of the mobile voter registration exercise from 12 to 26 November, followed by a further three-day extension from 27 to 29 November. CCMG welcomed the decision to extend the registration period and encouraged all eligible citizens to take advantage of the additional opportunity to register or update their details.

However, CCMG observed with concern that the planning and coordination of the extension period were inadequate. While the ECZ demonstrated innovation by partnering with Shoprite Zambia to expand access to registration services, the late announcement of these arrangements and the failure to promptly publish a comprehensive list of additional registration centres significantly constrained stakeholders' ability to prepare, limiting effective oversight and voter mobilisation.



Moreover, the ECZ did not publish detailed, disaggregated registration data showing progress against its stated target of 3.5 million registrants. In the absence of such data, stakeholders, including CCMG, were unable to assess patterns of under-registration or evaluate whether the extension was being deployed in a targeted and equitable manner. International best practices emphasise the use of registration trends and voting-age population projections to guide the electoral commission's reallocation of resources toward under-registered areas to maximise the effectiveness of extension periods.

CCMG further noted that deployment planning for the extension was conducted primarily at the district level and was not adequately consolidated or communicated at the national level or via the ECZ website and social media. This fragmentation undermined transparency, public awareness, and accountability. Although the ECZ later released a nationwide deployment plan, the document contained significant gaps and inconsistencies, including missing districts, mismatched phase dates, and insufficient identifying information for registration centres. These shortcomings limited the plan's utility for voters and stakeholders alike and underscore the need for a more coordinated, data-driven, and transparent approach to managing voter registration extensions.

# V. Registration Environment

During CCMG's weekly long-term observation reporting for the period 13 October - 29 November, CCMG's observers reported the following about the general voter registration environment:

**1. Voter Education/Information:** CCMG's observers reported a significant level of information/education activities on voter registration conducted by the ECZ/voter education facilitators (VEFs), with 94% either witnessing or hearing of these activities, and 69% reporting on voter information/education by local media. Only 4% of CCMG's observers witnessed/heard of these activities conducted by civil society organizations (CSOs).

**2. Political Parties and Traditional Leaders:** CCMG's observers reported mobilisation for voter registration activities by UPND (18%), PF (13%), and other parties (11%). In addition, 17% of CCMG's observers reported mobilisation and/or sensitisation activities on voter registration conducted by traditional leaders.

### **3. Electoral Code of Conduct Violations:**

1. Two (2) CCMG observers reported instances of people being ferried from areas outside of their constituencies by political parties or their agents (see VI. Critical Incidents).
2. Three (3) CCMG observers witnessed or heard of, or heard of and verified, instances of voter's card and/or National Registration Card (NRC) buying, destruction, or confiscation (see VI. Critical Incidents).
3. Thirteen percent (13%) of CCMG observers witnessed or heard of traditional or religious leaders using their influence to support a particular political party or candidate.
4. Four percent (4%) of CCMG observers reported non-elected government officials (e.g., civil servants) using their influence to support a particular political party.
5. One (1) CCMG observer witnessed or heard of an instance of non-elected government officials attending a political party event.
6. One (1) CCMG observer reported an instance of political party supporters or members being dressed in military (combat) attire.
7. One (1) CCMG observer reported a case where political party members or supporters used language that was inflammatory, defamatory, vulgar, or insulting (see VI. Critical Incidents).
8. One (1) CCMG observer reported an instance of disruption or a violent attack during a political party activity or meeting (see VI. Critical Incidents).
9. One (1) CCMG observer reported an instance of harassment and intimidation of an accredited observer at a registration centre.

### **4. General Environment and Civic Space:**

1. One (1) CCMG observer reported a political party being denied permission or having their permission revoked by the police for an activity/meeting in a public space (see VI. Critical Incidents).

## VI. Critical Incidents

During the registration exercise, CCMG documented twelve (12) critical incidents including permission for a political party meeting being revoked, ferrying, political violence, a non-elected government official attending a political party event, use of insulting language, underage registration, allegations of non-Zambians registering to vote, buying of NRC/voters' cards, and intimidation and harassment of an observer, detailed below:

- On 10 October, a CCMG observer in Senanga heard of an incident where a group of United Party for National Development (UPND) supporters were holding a meeting at Mulamba Market when a group of Patriotic Front (PF) supporters arrived and disrupted the gathering. The disruption escalated into a physical altercation, during which the PF supporters began stoning the UPND supporters and other individuals present at the market. The police intervened and arrested five (5) PF supporters, with no injuries reported.
- On 13 and 16 October, a CCMG observer in Chiengi Constituency reported an incident of allegations of non-Zambians registering to vote. The observer witnessed confirmed residents of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in possession of green NRCs, registering to vote at Muchese Community School.
- Between 13 and 17 October, a CCMG observer in Sinda Constituency heard of an incident where UPND supporters and PF supporters insulted each other when they clashed at Sinda Hood Market.
- On 15 October, a CCMG observer in Kapoche Constituency heard of the Sinda District Commissioner, who is also an aspiring MP, leading a meeting of UPND supporters and other community members in the Mng'omba area.
- A CCMG observer in Mpongwe Constituency heard of people of unknown political affiliation buying NRC and voters' cards at K1,500 each between 20 October and 26 October
- On 21 October, a CCMG observer in Chasefu Constituency witnessed an incident at Lupamadzi Secondary School where seven (7) pupils from the school, who appeared to be underage, presented themselves to register as voters. Their NRCs indicated that they would not turn 18 by 30 April 2026 - the eligibility cutoff date for voter registration. Despite this, ECZ officials at the centre proceeded to issue the pupils with voter's cards. On the same date, CCMG's observer witnessed individuals appearing to be non-Zambians registering to vote. The observer reported that these individuals, believed to be Malawian nationals, had both Malawian national IDs and green NRCs.
- Between October 27 and 31, a CCMG observer in Luanshya Constituency witnessed an incident where suspected UPND and PF officials bought physical voter's cards for K500 and voter's card details (only collected card details but not the physical cards) for K100 in Minkonfwa Ward.

- On October 29, a CCMG observer in Chasefu Constituency heard of an incident where the police revoked the permission initially granted to the Citizens First Party to hold a rally for unknown reasons.
- On October 31, a CCMG observer in Mpongwe Constituency reported witnessing an incident where UPND officials bought voter's cards and NRCs at K1500 each in Shingwa Ward.
- On November 1, a CCMG Observer in Chama South Constituency heard of the UPND MP aspirant ferrying people from Chama North Constituency to Chama South Constituency to register to vote and offered them K300 while encouraging them to vote for him in next year's election.
- On November 24, a CCMG observer at Jordan UCZ Community School in Matero Constituency reported an incident of harassment and intimidation by the area Member of Parliament, Miles Sampa, who questioned her presence at the centre and demanded to see her ID. The observer identified herself and presented her accreditation card, which Sampa forcefully grabbed, arguing that observers should not be at registration centres. Sampa proceeded to photograph the observer including her accreditation card, and posted these photos on his Facebook page. The incident occurred in the presence of Zambia Police officers and ECZ officials who did not intervene, with no followup remedial action taken.
- On November 26, a CCMG observer in Livingstone Constituency heard of an incident at Mbita Market, a voter registration centre, where two (2) individuals were injured after Police fired shots amid confusion at the centre involving UPND cadres and the Police. There were no reports of arrests. Following the incident, the UPND General Secretary expelled all UPND party members involved in the incident.

## VI. Recommendations



## **1. Electoral Commission of Zambia**

- a. Institutionalise Transparent and Timely Observer Accreditation:** The ECZ should formalise and institutionalise clear, consistent accreditation procedures for observers and political party agents for all electoral activities, including voter registration. These procedures should be developed in collaboration with monitoring and civil society organisations and take into consideration recommendations from previous electoral cycles. Section 77 of the Electoral Process Act should be amended accordingly. Accreditation processes should be decentralised where feasible, time-bound, communicated well in advance, and seek to minimise the administrative burden for both the ECZ and the observers. Arbitrary limits on the number of observers per constituency should be removed, as they undermine transparency and are inconsistent with regional and international best practices.
- b. Guarantee Access to Non-Sensitive Registration Information:** The ECZ should standardise clear guidance requiring registration officials to provide accredited observers with non-sensitive information, including daily provisional registration statistics. Consistent access to such information is essential for transparency, independent verification, and public confidence in the process.
- c. Strengthen Staffing Levels and Operational Resilience at Registration Centres:** The ECZ should ensure that a minimum of two trained officials are deployed to each registration centre. To address fluctuating demand, the Commission should establish reserve or rotational staffing pools at district and provincial levels that can be rapidly deployed to high-traffic or understaffed centres. Adequate staffing is critical to service efficiency, accountability, and continuity during technical disruptions.
- d. Improve Logistical Preparedness and Availability of Backup Registration Kits:** The ECZ should ensure that all registration centres are equipped with functional backup registration kits. Persistent shortages significantly increase the risk of service interruptions when technical failures occur, as was observed throughout the six phases of the mass voter registration exercise. Logistical planning should be informed by historical data on kit breakdowns and power constraints, particularly in high-risk provinces.
- e. Publish Disaggregated Registration Data and Targets on a Routine Basis:** The ECZ should adopt a consistent practice of publishing voter registration targets and provisional registration data disaggregated by province, district, and constituency, gender and age group. Such data enable stakeholders to assess progress, identify under-registered areas, support targeted mobilisation, and evaluate the need for

extensions. Data transparency should be treated as a core accountability function, not an ad hoc practice.

- f. Strengthen National–District Coordination and Stakeholder Communication:** The ECZ should ensure alignment between national deployment plans and district-level implementation. All registration and extension deployment plans should be consolidated, validated, and publicly released at the national level in advance of implementation. Clear, accurate, and timely communication on registration locations, dates, and any changes is essential for citizen participation and effective stakeholder oversight.
- g. Systematically Address Physical Accessibility of Registration Centres:** The ECZ should adopt universal design principles in the selection and preparation of registration centres to eliminate physical barriers, including steps and stairs. The Commission should work in consultation with organisations of persons with disabilities to review disability classification categories and translate collected data into concrete accessibility accommodations for both registration and polling day.
- h. Promote Gender Balance Among Registration Officials and Supervisors:** The ECZ should implement targeted recruitment, training, and deployment strategies to increase the representation of women among registration officials, including in leadership roles. Gender balance should be treated as an operational standard rather than an aspirational goal, particularly given the high proportion of centres that were staffed exclusively by men.
- i. Enforce the Electoral Code of Conduct During Voter Registration:** The ECZ should strengthen enforcement of the Electoral Code of Conduct during voter registration, including prompt investigation and sanctioning of violations such as voter inducement, NRC or voter's card buying, and intimidation. This sanctioning should be timely and transparent in order to serve as a deterrent and foster greater accountability. The Commission should also proactively publicise its incident reporting mechanism (\*214#) and periodically release anonymised data on reported incidents and outcomes. CCMG is saddened by the incident of harassment and intimidation of its accredited observer by Miles Sampa at a registration centre, and commends the ECZ for writing to Miles Sampa to reprimand him for his unprofessional conduct, and for contravening Section 94(1)(a) of the Electoral Process Act. CCMG calls on the ECZ to publish the letter to serve as a deterrent in future.
- j. Address Vote Buying and Inducements Through Inter-Agency Coordination:** The

ECZ should work closely with the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to ensure effective enforcement of Section 35 of the Anti-Corruption Act in relation to offences under the Electoral Process Act. Documented cases of voter and NRC card buying during registration underscore the need for visible, coordinated deterrence measures.

- k. Adopt a Data-Driven Framework for Registration Extensions:** Any extension of voter registration should be guided by transparent, data-driven criteria. The ECZ should publicly release disaggregated registration data, apply voting-age population projections, and clearly justify extension decisions. Consolidated national deployment plans for extension periods should be published in advance to enable citizen participation and stakeholder monitoring.
- l. Review the Duration and Timing of Future Voter Registration Exercises:** The ECZ should consider extending the duration of voter registration exercises in future electoral cycles and intensifying pre-registration voter education and mobilisation. Repeated extensions indicate that current timelines may be insufficient to ensure broad and equitable participation. Similarly, the ECZ should assess if the 4-day phase approach is more efficient than the previous 7-day phase approach, particularly as awareness of the exercise may be limited in some areas.

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## **2. Political Parties**

- a. Deploy Trained Representatives to Observe Registration Processes:** Political parties should prioritise the training, accreditation, and deployment of representatives to observe voter registration. Their consistent presence enhances transparency and accountability and fulfils parties' responsibilities as key electoral stakeholders.
- b. Intensify Non-Coercive Voter Mobilisation and Sensitisation:** Political parties should increase lawful and non-coercive voter registration mobilisation, particularly targeting first-time voters, youth, women, and under-registered communities. Mobilisation efforts should strictly adhere to the Electoral Code of Conduct.
- c. Enforce Internal Compliance with the Electoral Code of Conduct:** Party leadership should take responsibility for preventing, investigating, and sanctioning violations of the Electoral Code of Conduct by their members and supporters, including inducement, intimidation, and inflammatory conduct. This includes respecting the rights of observers, electoral officials and party agents from other parties participating in the voter registration process.

### **3. Civil Society and Faith-Based Organisations:**

- a. Expand Targeted Voter Education and Information Dissemination:** Civil society and faith-based organisations should intensify voter education efforts, particularly in contexts where official information on registration locations and schedules is delayed or unclear. Targeted outreach to women, youth, persons with disabilities, and first-time voters is especially critical.

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### **4. Zambia Police:**

- a. Enforce Electoral Laws Impartially and Consistently:** The Zambia Police Service should enforce the Electoral Process Act impartially and without fear or favour. This includes protecting the rights of all political parties to mobilise lawfully, responding promptly to electoral offences, and contributing to a secure environment for voter registration. Further, the police should ensure that issues related to political violence, including the harassment and intimidation of observers, are handled expeditiously as a deterrent.

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### **5. Zambian Citizens:**

- a. Participate Actively and Verify Registration Details:** CCMG commends all citizens who registered during the exercise, particularly first-time voters, women, and persons with disabilities. CCMG encourages all eligible citizens to verify their registration details when provisional voters' lists are published and to report any irregularities through established channels.

## VIII. Methodology



CCMG trained, accredited and deployed observers to a statistically representative sample of 1,000 registration centres across all regions and provinces of the country for two days during each of the six phases. Additionally, CCMG deployed its observers to observe the registration extension through four days of deployment. However, in total, 12% of CCMG observers found that the registration team had not deployed to the designated location (possibly due to changes made at the district level to the national plan for mobile voter registration). The issue was observed at 13% of centres on day 1 of the observation and at 11% on day 2 across all phases. The margin of error was estimated at approximately 2.1% for data for all of Phases 1 to 6.

**Distribution of All and Sampled Mobile Registration Centres by Province**

Province	All Centres		Sampled Centres		Difference
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Central	1,046	8.6%	85	8.5%	-0.1%
Copperbelt	1,724	14.2%	143	14.3%	0.1%
Eastern	1,546	12.7%	126	12.6%	-0.1%
Luapula	1,025	8.4%	85	8.5%	0.1%
Lusaka	1,554	12.8%	128	12.8%	0.0%
Muchinga	687	5.6%	56	5.6%	0.0%
North-Western	801	6.6%	65	6.5%	-0.1%
Northern	1,111	9.1%	93	9.3%	0.2%
Southern	1,518	12.5%	125	12.5%	0.0%
Western	1,152	9.5%	94	9.4%	-0.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,164</b>		<b>1,000</b>		

### Distribution of All and Sampled Mobile Registration Centres by Phase

Phase	All Centres		Sampled Centres		Difference
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
<b>1st (13-16 Oct)</b>	<b>2,057</b>	<b>16.9%</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>16.9%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>
<b>2nd (18-21 Oct)</b>	<b>2,006</b>	<b>16.5%</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>16.5%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>
<b>3rd (23-26 Oct)</b>	<b>2,034</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>
<b>4th (28 – 31 Oct)</b>	<b>2,029</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>
<b>5th (2 - 5 Nov)</b>	<b>2,009</b>	<b>16.5%</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>16.5%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>
<b>6th (7 – 11 Nov)</b>	<b>2,029</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,164</b>		<b>1,000</b>		

CCMG's observers used specific checklists and critical incident forms to systematically collect information on opening, setup, registration, and closing of voter registration centres. CCMG's observers sent their observation reports to the CCMG Data Centre, where information was analysed, and any critical incident reports were followed up on. CCMG's observers also sent in weekly reports on the overall electoral environment, including stakeholder activities such as civic and voter education and mobilisation, and any breaches of the Electoral Code of Conduct.



Table 16: Sampled Registration Centres Observed and Open

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	79%	86%	100%	87%	86%	83%	87%
Copperbelt	89%	94%	96%	90%	92%	96%	93%
Eastern	74%	81%	69%	93%	90%	79%	81%
Luapula	86%	93%	89%	93%	93%	96%	92%
Lusaka	100%	100%	93%	97%	97%	100%	98%
Muchinga	100%	94%	100%	100%	100%	88%	97%
North-Western	57%	77%	82%	68%	68%	75%	74%
Northern	83%	100%	100%	94%	94%	90%	94%
Southern	79%	88%	76%	80%	80%	68%	80%
Western	70%	81%	88%	94%	94%	89%	84%
<b>Total</b>	<b>83%</b>	<b>90%</b>	<b>88%</b>	<b>90%</b>	<b>90%</b>	<b>87%</b>	<b>88%</b>

# IX. Conclusion

CCMG's observation of the 2025 mobile mass voter registration exercise demonstrates that Zambia's electoral administration has the capacity to deliver procedurally sound and increasingly reliable registration processes. Over the six phases, the Electoral Commission of Zambia made measurable improvements in observer access, adherence to registration procedures, technical stability of registration kits, and inclusive practices at registration centres. These gains contributed to improved operational consistency and strengthened the credibility of the process in its later stages.

However, the exercise also exposed persistent structural and systemic weaknesses that must be addressed ahead of the 2026 General Election. While CCMG documented strong adherence to registration procedures, CCMG noted that there were centre closures and delays, staffing shortages, limited availability of backup registration kits, and misalignment between national and district deployment plans. Physical accessibility barriers remained widespread, disproportionately affecting persons with disabilities and others with limited mobility. A lack of transparency, particularly inconsistent access to daily registration data, failure to release disaggregated targets and provisional registration figures, and poor planning for observer accreditation, continued to undermine effective oversight and stakeholder confidence.

The planning and implementation of the registration extension further highlighted several areas where there was weak coordination and insufficient data-driven decision-making. Without timely publication of disaggregated registration data and consolidated deployment plans, stakeholders were unable to assess coverage gaps or support targeted mobilisation efforts effectively. Additionally, while the ECZ provided an online tool for voters to find out when their registration centre was open, the tool followed the national-level deployment plan and did not take into consideration changes done at district level.

Taken together, these findings suggest that while incremental operational improvements are evident and registration procedures were followed, improvements to planning, logistics, transparency and communication are required to strengthen voter registration as a cornerstone of electoral integrity. Addressing logistical preparedness, staffing capacity, accessibility, transparency, and stakeholder engagement will be essential to ensuring that future registration exercises and electoral processes are not only technically sound but also inclusive, equitable, and trusted by all Zambians.

## X. About CCMG

The Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG) is an alliance of three faith-based organisations formed to help promote credible elections through non-partisan citizen monitoring. The CCMG partner organisations are the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ), Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), and Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops (ZCCB). CCMG was founded ahead of the 20 January 2015 presidential election. CCMG is a member of the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM)<sup>2</sup>, African Election Observers Network (AfEONet) and the Election Support Network-Southern Africa (ESN-SA) and conducts all of its observation efforts in conformity with the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organisations<sup>3</sup>. CCMG is strictly independent and non-partisan. We support no political party or candidate.

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2 <https://gndem.org/>  
3 <https://gndem.org/declaration-of-global-principles/>

# XI. Annexes

**Annex 1: Registration Centres with No Women Registration Officials**

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	48%	37%	70%	48%	29%	60%	50%
Copperbelt	51%	43%	45%	48%	48%	43%	46%
Eastern	71%	50%	41%	61%	45%	24%	49%
Luapula	54%	43%	52%	38%	44%	48%	46%
Lusaka	39%	45%	29%	39%	23%	30%	34%
Muchinga	38%	24%	40%	44%	33%	47%	38%
North-Western	60%	29%	56%	13%	33%	53%	39%
Northern	12%	50%	43%	27%	43%	52%	38%
Southern	47%	35%	38%	31%	34%	46%	38%
Western	19%	40%	39%	33%	21%	20%	30%
<b>Total</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>41%</b>

**Annex 2: Registration Centres where the Official in Charge was a Woman**

Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	35%	42%	14%	37%	62%	24%	34%
Copperbelt	34%	42%	41%	30%	30%	43%	37%
Eastern	14%	38%	35%	24%	21%	67%	34%
Luapula	38%	50%	24%	62%	32%	44%	42%
Lusaka	54%	45%	65%	47%	67%	61%	57%
Muchinga	44%	65%	40%	33%	56%	40%	46%

## CCMG 2025 Mobile Voter Registration Observation Report – Phase 1 – 6 Report

North-Western	20%	41%	28%	44%	50%	33%	37%
Northern	80%	34%	38%	50%	39%	48%	47%
Southern	34%	38%	50%	44%	29%	32%	38%
Western	69%	46%	25%	40%	50%	60%	47%
<b>Total</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>42%</b>

### Annex 3: Registration Centres with Steps/Stairs


Province	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Central	61%	53%	73%	56%	50%	68%	61%
Copperbelt	73%	59%	64%	59%	75%	70%	66%
Eastern	43%	56%	62%	55%	37%	42%	49%
Luapula	67%	46%	64%	50%	72%	85%	64%
Lusaka	56%	50%	63%	61%	59%	65%	59%
Muchinga	81%	88%	90%	89%	72%	100%	87%
North-Western	90%	88%	89%	88%	67%	60%	80%
Northern	88%	81%	90%	77%	82%	74%	82%
Southern	56%	57%	75%	62%	66%	64%	63%
Western	81%	68%	68%	67%	42%	76%	66%
<b>Total</b>	<b>66%</b>	<b>62%</b>	<b>72%</b>	<b>64%</b>	<b>62%</b>	<b>69%</b>	<b>66%</b>



*Annex 4: Registration Centres with Critical Materials*

Material	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Phase 6	Average
Registration Kit	100%	98%	100%	100%	99%	100%	99%
Backup Registration Kit	54%	49%	49%	48%	50%	50%	50%
Application Forms	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Working Camera	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	99%	99%
Laminates	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	99%





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